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UNsatisfied? The Rocky Path to NATO 
Membership – Bosnia and Herzegovina: 




NATO’s enlargement in the Western Balkans (WB) has been the focus of a number of debates for 
almost two decades. Opinions and positions regarding this question range from serious doubts, 
criticisms and opportunistic press releases to enthusiastic support for membership. This paper 
assesses Bosnian reforms and policy changes, as well as the country’s efforts to join NATO. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) has made significant steps in moving towards NATO’s military and political 
standards, but not sufficiently. Although BiH is viewed by some observers as a country approaching 
the point of joining the Membership Action Plan (MAP), this prospect remains uncertain. The findings 
of this research suggest that BiH is different from other WB countries and that it is not suitable for 
understanding the NATO integration challenges in the WB. In order to understand Bosnian ‘specifics’, 
it is necessary not only to view the challenges through the prism of technical and other domestic 
issues in BiH. A wider approach must be adopted. Through understanding the Bosnian specifics, the 
dilemmas related to the NATO membership of BiH become more obvious and clear. Bosnian specifics 
illustrate why BiH is not able to take significant steps towards long-term stabilization and NATO 
membership. 
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Introduction
Since the end of the Bosnian war, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has 
accomplished several essential changes for successful transition into 
a more democratic society. The fundamental issues of this process of 
democratization are related to EU and NATO integration. In the Balkan 
context, “the promise of closer ties to the European Union and, to a lesser 
extent, to NATO have been key drivers for reform in the Western Balkans” 
(Benyon 2017: 5) following the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
BiH is a country aspiring to join NATO (NATO 2017c: i). It bases such 
an ambition on the progress it has achieved so far, as well as on its 
determination to implement essential reforms and to contribute to NATO-
led missions. In addition, BiH is located in a geographically important 
region — the military can easily be deployed to the Middle East, Northern 
Africa, the Black Sea region, Eastern Europe and Western Europe from 
this region (Milinkovich 2016: ii) — and has proved itself a worthy NATO 
partner.
However, BiH is faced with a number of concerns and challenges 
regarding NATO membership. Its integration process is marked with 
continued difficulties, though a significant number of positive successes 
have been achieved. NATO membership by BiH could be understood 
in terms of ‘for better or for worse’, depending on which ethnic group 
(Bosniak, Serb or Croat) one belongs to. The country has serious difficulties 
overcoming internal disputes in order to reach clear agreement on the 
key issues regarding vital national interests.
This paper analyses the issues that hinder the Bosnian NATO integration 
process. By analysing the Bosnian specifics, it is possible to understand that 
even NATO membership by BiH cannot be viewed in terms of its domestic 
issues, as it encompasses regional actors and issues. These specifics prevent 
BiH from taking faster steps towards long-term stabilization and NATO 
membership. The paper aims to explain the importance of domestic politics 
for the WB state’s foreign policies. Also, the paper includes an analysis of 
the influence of neighbouring countries on Bosnian NATO integration.
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Theoretical framework and discussion
This paper first refers to some theoretical propositions as to reasons for 
alignment and the necessity for states to join an alliance. Most of the 
theories which define alliances and their nature are based on realist 
propositions. These assumptions explain the basic reason for alignment 
as the clear intention of two or more countries to aggregate their 
capabilities and powers because of fear of another country. Alliances 
are often regarded as the reaction to a threatening power. Alliances are 
sometimes created not only as a reaction to a power threatening their 
security, but as a reaction to the perceived threat. “States ally to balance 
against threats rather than against power alone. Although the distribution 
of power is an extremely important factor, the level of threat is also 
affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived 
intentions” (Walt 1987: 5). This approach seems to be more applicable to 
understand the reasons why BiH should become a NATO member state. 
But joining an alliance does not have to deal only with power balancing 
or perceived threat. George Liska (1962: 30) in Nations in alliance: the 
limits of interdependence, identified three main reasons for alignment: 
“internal and international security, stability and status of states and 
regimes”. Tatsuya Nishida suggests that “in general, the existence of a 
threat or hostile power is a necessary condition for developing a security 
alliance” (in Warren 2010: 11). 
After the post-Cold War period, the number of countries that wanted to 
become NATO members increased. In some of the cases, the “theories 
of balance of power or balance of threat cannot adequately explain 
reasons for such behaviour” (Grizold and Vegic 2001: 127). The reasons 
to become a NATO member state became more complex, while NATO 
changed its raison d’être. On the other hand, the threats that remained 
part of the countries’ history were for some states serious enough to 
encourage them to join NATO. 
In order to understand the Bosnian NATO integration process, two other 
factors need to be included in the analysis: (i) the history of conflicts in BiH 
and its people; and (ii) substantial violation of some of the provisions of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) — specifically, Annex 1-B: regional 
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stabilization. Firstly, through analysing some of the key events in the history 
of BiH, it can be concluded that the country has passed through many 
ethno-religious conflicts at both the inter-state and intra-state levels. 
Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in BiH have fought against each other and all of 
the conflicts led to massive human and capital losses. In addition, Croatia 
and Serbia both laid claim to the territory of BiH. The territorial pretension 
is demonstrated by the four strategic documents written by prestigious 
Serbian leaders and institutions: (i) Načertanije (1844) by Ilija Garašanin; 
(ii) Serbs All and Everywhere (1849) by Vuk Karadžić; (iii) Homogeneous 
Serbia (1941) by Stevan Moljević; and (iv) Memorandum (1986) by the 
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) (see more: Croatian 
Information Centre 1993). All of these documents propose the spread 
of Serbian influence, mainly by propaganda and through a network of 
pro-Serbian rebels, the major goal being to create a favourable situation 
for Serbian national interests in BiH. There is a lack of clear distancing 
from these tendencies among the political elites in Serbia. In addition, 
condemnation of the above-mentioned historical documents would play 
a significant role in establishing sustainable and peaceful relations with 
the neighbouring countries.
In addition, the Karađorđevo meeting of 25 March 1991 was a meeting 
on the issue to redistribute BiH between Croatia and Serbia. The meeting 
was attended by Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and Serbian President 
Slobodan Milošević, and their delegations. Judge Mark Brian Harmon, 
on 16 March 1998, announced witness Stjepan Mesić1 before the Hague 
Tribunal in the case of General Tihomir Blaškić as follows:
“He [Stjepan Mesić] will testify about President Tuđman’s 
dual policy towards Bosnia, one which was a public policy of 
recognition of the independence of Bosnia, and a clandestine 
policy to divide Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia. He will testify 
in that regard about a meeting that took place in 1991 between 
Slobodan Milošević and President Tuđman at Karađorđevo, after 
which President Tuđman’s clandestine policy to divide Bosnia 
was implemented” (Case No IT-95-14-A1998a).
Prosecutor Gregory W. Kehoe accepted the assumption of the 
1 Former Croatian politician. He served as Croatian President from 2000 to 2010. 
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Karađorđevo meeting as a secret one (Case No IT-95-14-A1998b). Serbia 
aimed to secure the lands in eastern and western Bosnia. Croatia wanted 
to secure lands in BiH in which Croats were the majority. This plan was 
magnified when Milošević supported Serbs in Croatia to commit horrible 
war crimes against Croats, including ethnic cleansing. On the other 
hand, other interpretations of this meeting [Karađorđevo] say that it is 
not convincing to make a secret agreement during a public meeting 
(Tuđman 2015).
Secondly, although the WB region remains unstable and there have been 
many instances of DPA violation, the possibility of a new war in BiH was 
substantially reduced with the implementation of the DPA. However, 
since it was signed, the world has witnessed continuous infringements 
of the DPA in many domains: in this study, only the military aspects are 
presented. Taking into account a history of ethno-religious conflicts and 
disputes, the international negotiators and mediators blueprinted long-
term regional peace through Annex 1 (the military aspect) of the DPA. 
Signatories of the DPA agreed to authorize the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to organize and conduct negotiations 
in order to establish regional — military capability (equipment) — balance 
in and around the former Yugoslavia “based on the approximate ratio of 
populations of the Parties” (United Nations 1995). This has been partially 
changed, but not annulled. 
On 4 December 2014, BiH, Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia signed the 
Amendment to the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (Annex 1B, 
Article IV of DPA) at the 21st OSCE Ministerial Council in Basel. The aim of 
this amendment was to introduce new measures for regional stabilization 
and arms control, wherein the Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreement was 
assigned to the four parties of the agreement: BiH, Serbia, Croatia and 
Montenegro. The transfer of this ownership was strongly supported by the 
OSCE, the EU and the Contact Group countries.2 “The transfer of ownership 
is not a withdrawal of the International Community or an attempt to leave 
the countries alone in the process to come. Co-operation in all matters of 
arms control will remain with the OSCE, shifting from hands on assistance 
to a more supportive role,” said Major General Michele Torres3 (OSCE 
2 The United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Russia.
3 Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for Article IV, Annex 1-B.
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2014a: xi). Additionally, Didier Burkhalter, the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office 
and Foreign Minister of Switzerland, argued that “the Dayton Article IV 
Agreement has been—and remains—highly relevant for stability in the 
region and for the entire OSCE area. It serves as a model for other OSCE 
regions in order to enhance security and stability” (OSCE 2014b: vii). Article 
IV of the DPA provides legal methods and instructive inspections of the 
armaments in the Balkans.4 However, there is a significant gap between 
policy and practice of arms control.
Annex 1 of the DPA (even after the amendment) has been violated and 
not many studies have directly addressed this issue. The rivalry fuelling the 
ongoing arms race in the Balkans is a part of current politics, but it dates 
back to the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. “Croatia would like 
to buy US artillery systems, while Serbia has put Russian missile defence 
systems on its wish list” (Deutsche Welle 2016: i). Also, Vučić agreed with 
Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu that Russia would give to Serbia 
“six MiG-29 jets, 30 T-72 tanks and 30 BRDM 2 reconnaissance vehicles” 
(Pantovic 2016: iv). Additionally, Serbia received sophisticated military 
equipment from Belarus. Interestingly, Serbia also received “16 rubber 
boats with outboard engines, five snowmobiles and 10 portable devices 
for detecting explosives and narcotics” (Sputnik 2017: i) from China as 
a military donation. All of these donations are powerful weapons that 
significantly change the military balance and destabilize the WB region. In 
the sense of military alliances and foreign support, BiH is lagging behind its 
neighbours. Moreover, the best indicator that Annex 1 — ‘regional stability’ 
— is reshaped in the Balkans is the military strength rankings. For instance, 
Global Firepower ranked the armed forces of BiH 121st (Global Firepower 
2017a), Serbia 83rd (Global Firepower 2017c) and Croatia 68th (Global 
Firepower 2017b) out of 133 countries.5 This clearly shows that Annex 1 
did not provide regional stability and/or balance among the signatories 
of DPA, because BiH lags many places behind Serbia and Croatia. The 
differences are not so small as to be considered insignificant, but rather 
they are worrisome, since they have been clearly defined by the DPA. 
Additionally, Serbia is the only state in the WB region that has no clear 
4 It established control of conventional armaments in five separate categories: attack helicopters, armored combat 
vehicles, combat aircraft, battle tanks and artillery pieces.
5 Important note: Montenegrois not listed amog the 133 countries.
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desire to join NATO and with a significant pro-Russian attitude. All the 
other countries have either been member states for a long time or are in 
the process of becoming members. The Croatian case is much different 
because it is a NATO member state, an organization with a friendly 
attitude towards BiH. In other words, in case of Croatia, the regional 
stability has been reshaped with NATO membership because, as a NATO 
member, Croatia was requested to follow NATO standards in order to 
participate alongside other forces in NATO-led missions and later in EU-led 
missions. Being asked about the arms rivalry between Serbia and Croatia, 
Boris Jernić, the deputy defence minister of BiH, stated: “When Croatia 
purchased new weapons, no one from Serbia commented on it; now, 
when Serbia is doing so [buying new weapons], they comment [referring 
to Croatian media]”, adding, and “when it comes to the modernization, 
the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) have a very limited 
budget, because significant amounts of resources are being spent on the 
maintenance of existing [military] capacities. We do not have demands, 
and in the upcoming period, I think that it [the modernization] will not 
come and with the current budget that we have, we surely cannot follow 
Serbia and Croatia” (BN 2015: vii, author’s translation). Nevertheless, the 
budget is not the main challenge. Milorad Dodik, President of Republika 
Srpska (RS), stated that he would ask the National Assembly of RS (NARS) 
to withdraw the deceleration of RS’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic 
integration and accept a new deceleration for military neutrality, and for 
NARS to make a decision on further steps for the demilitarization of BiH (for 
more, see BN 2017: vi–ix; Faktor 2017: iii-iv). Such a policy is presented in 
the willingness of RS to follow the military status of Serbia (Radio Slobodna 
Europa 2016: iii). In addition, the policy of demilitarization directly conflicts 
with the DPA and Annex 1, because if BiH were left without military forces, 
it would be difficult to measure the regional stability among the signatories 
of DPA.
However, although from the above it can be concluded that BiH, in order 
to secure its borders, should become a NATO member state, the ethnic 
groups (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) have divergent attitudes towards 
NATO. The geopolitical rivalry between Serbia and Croatia and the 
NATO membership of BiH could be understood in terms of which ethnic 
group one belongs to. Therefore, the NATO membership of BiH cannot be 
viewed only as a reaction to threatening power, but rather as a reaction 
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to perceived threat, too. With membership of NATO, the balance of 
power promised under Annex 1-B of DPA would return to the region, and 
especially to BiH. Additionally, James D. Fearon (1998: 1) suggests that “a 
significant amount of recent research in the international relations (IR) field 
advances the proposition that domestic politics is typically a crucial part 
of the explanation for states’ foreign policies”. Scholars of comparative 
politics argue that the foreign orientation of a country cannot be 
understood without understanding the domestic politics. When it comes 
to BiH, one could ask whether the domestic politics area product of the 
foreign policy, or the foreign policy a product of the domestic politics. 
This paper defines four specifics of BiH — created by both internal and 
external factors — that shape the country’s NATO integration process. 
Understanding the country’s specifics will provide a better insight into the 
way the domestic politics influence the NATO integration process, as well 
as into the foreign policy choice of BiH that seems to depend mostly on 
the issues of domestic politics.
Status and issues of the Bosnian NATO integration 
process 
BiH joined the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) in 2006. The PfP is 
a programme of practical bilateral cooperation, a platform for individual 
Euro-Atlantic partner states interested in cooperating with NATO and 
making use of different NATO programmes (NATO 2017a: i). It is a 
mechanism that leads to an opportunity to develop official cooperation 
with NATO. The focal points of the cooperation are democratic, 
institutional and defence reforms. In order to proceed with the process 
of becoming a member state, the relations of a country with NATO must 
keep expanding into new fields. In September 2008, the political elites in 
BiH agreed to launch the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). IPAP 
introduced new forms of cooperation between BiH and NATO. This led 
to a shift from purely defence to political issues. It is designed to “bring 
together all the various cooperation mechanisms through which a partner 
country interacts with the Alliance, sharpening the focus of activities to 
better support their domestic reform efforts” (NATO 2017a: i), as well as 
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to “develop affordable capabilities for their own security needs” (Pond 
2004: x). Also, cooperation under the IPAP includes implementation 
of the reform processes necessary for creating preconditions for NATO 
membership. BiH moved through IPAP evaluation cycles from 2008 to 
2010 (Ministry of Defence of BiH 2011). The first IPAP was agreed between 
NATO and BiH in September 2008 (NATO 2017a: vi) and an updated IPAP 
version was agreed in September 2014 (NATO 2017c: xxii). 
BiH has also been participating in the PfP Planning and Review Process 
(PARP) since May 2007. The participation of partner countries in PARP is 
a precondition for joining the Membership Action Plan (MAP). This is a 
tool used to identify “capabilities that could be available to the Alliance 
for multinational training, exercises and operations” (NATO 2014b: xxiv). 
Based on the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan (EAPWP), all members 
of the NATO PfP are required to develop their Individual Partnership 
Programme (IPP): it covers a period of two years, but revision and 
updates are made annually (Defence Reform Commission 2003). The IPP 
is approved by the Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for 
Peace (PMSC) and is proposed by the PfP member countries. According 
to the Defence White Paper of BiH (2005), the country expressed the 
priorities for cooperation in its IPP “in the areas that will enhance the 
establishment of command, control, communication and information 
systems, planning and budgeting, resource management and training 
and equipping; these will facilitate internal and external interoperability, 
and thus enhance the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces of 
BiH (AFBiH), particularly with respect to peace support and humanitarian 
operations” (p. 17). Beyond participation in these mechanisms, BiH has 
signed and ratified the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO. 
This multilateral agreement deals with the status of foreign forces while 
present on the territory of another state (NATO 2014a: i). Through the NATO 
PfP programmes, BiH enables the country’s AFBiH to participate in NATO’s 
military activities and trainings in the country (e.g. the military exercise 
Combined Endeavour 2009, Banja Luka, BiH) and abroad, through a 
series of activities contained in the Individual Partnership Programme. 
Also, since 2009, members of AFBiH have deployed and contributed to 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. 
In June 2009, the Presidency of BiH decided to apply for MAP. Soon 
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after, on 2 October 2009, the BiH delegation, led by the Chairman of the 
Presidency of BiH, Željko Komšić, submitted an application to join MAP. 
NATO welcomed the progress and reforms in BiH and in April 2010 the 
Alliance invited BiH to join MAP. During the Tallinn Summit, NATO Foreign 
Ministers authorized the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Permanent Session 
to accept BiH’s Annual National Programme once a key remaining issue 
of immovable defence property had been resolved.
Unlike the other mechanisms, mostly technical in their nature, MAP is purely 
political, and that is one of the main reasons for the Bosnian failure to join 
MAP. Many political failures resulting from political disagreement and lack 
of cooperation between political elites regarding the requirement that all 
immovable defence properties be registered as state property prevent 
BiH from joining MAP. In his speech delivered on 29 June 2011, NATO 
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called on the political leaders 
of BiH “to demonstrate vision, leadership and the ability to compromise, 
and to continue on the path of political and economic reform. A solution 
to the property issue would demonstrate that BiH functions like one state. 
That it is capable to interact with NATO and to fulfil its commitments within 
the Membership Action Plan” (NATO 2011: xix–xx). Once BiH meets these 
conditions, ANP could be immediately activated as a mechanism and 
document under MAP.
Under strong pressure from the international community in BiH, six main 
ruling party leaders6 finally agreed on 9 March 2012 on the “registration 
and use of military and state property, long-running disputes which had 
held up Bosnia’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) with NATO” (International 
Crisis Group 2012: 10). At the NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012, Alliance 
leaders welcomed the political consensus in BiH (NATO 2012: xxviii), but 
the agreement was delayed soon after. Furthermore, in order to meet the 
conditions defined under NAC, the Presidency of BiH identified sixty-three 
prospective military locations and the Ministry of Defence of BiH prepared 
two strategic documents — The Agreement on the Implementation of 
Agreed Principles of Distribution of Property and The Decision to Use 
Immovable Defence Property — for the Council of Ministers to initiate the 
process. In addition, the Council of Ministers established a working group 
6 The six included the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990), the Alliance 
of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and 
the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP BiH).
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whose main task was to design a proposal to overcome disputes related 
to the registration of defence and/or state property. The leader of the 
Party of Democratic Progress, Mladen Ivanić (current Serb member of 
the Presidency), pointed out that the unsolved issue of defence property 
is an instrument to freeze the process of Bosnian integration into NATO, 
adding that “it is easier for [politicians from the Republika Srpska] to 
talk about a dispute over property than a dispute over membership in 
NATO” (Bećirević, Ćurak and Turčalo 2014: 34). Although BiH has made 
progress in many technical aspects and mechanisms, the state is still 
stagnating regarding the NATO membership process because every 
Law on State Property has been ignored by the political elite in the 
Republika Srpska. Also, according to the Ministry of Defence of BiH (2011: 
21), “due to the failure to meet the condition attached with regard to 
immovable prospective defence property, the ANP document was put 
on ice and the implementation of the IPAP, as the previous mechanism of 
cooperation with NATO, was reactivated”. This state of affairs regarding 
MAP will therefore remain unchanged until the authorities of BiH meet a 
consensus for the registration of the immovable defence property. Lastly, 
once joined, MAP will outline preparations for possible future membership, 
but activation of MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on 
future membership. Once MAP is activated, the Alliance will still expect 
BiH to continue with reforms.
Specifics of the Bosnian NATO integration process 
With its entrance into the NATO integration process, BiH identified its 
membership of NATO as one of the priorities of its foreign policy. Various 
declarations of parliaments, decisions of the Presidency of BiH, General 
Direction and Priorities for Implementation of Foreign Policy of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina7, ‘Defence White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina’8, as well 
as other documents defined NATO membership of BiH as a strategic goal. 
However, the official state-level NATO policy is shaped by both external 
7 For more, see: Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003). 
8 For more, see: Defence White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005: 5, 12, 14, 15 and other).
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and internal factors which at the moment prevent BiH from joining MAP. 
In fact, with the internal and external factors that prevail, even the state 
official documents are indicators that show that the NATO integration 




The majority of Balkan and East European countries are NATO member 
states. Those countries built their political systems on the tradition of 
parliamentary or semi-presidential political systems. These two political 
systems enabled the above-mentioned countries to pass more easily 
through the reforms to become member states of the EU and/or NATO. 
On the other hand, BiH’s political system is built on the foundations of 
the federal parliamentary republic, encompassing the tradition of the 
consociational democracy defined by the Dayton Peace Agreement in 
1995. With such a political system, BiH is unable to reach a consensus on 
the internal reforms needed for membership of the EU and NATO.
In order to prevent a relapse into violence in BiH, the international 
community outlined a comprehensive agreement for BiH and all the 
warring sides. It meant that post-war BiH would be based on four traditional 
consociational institutions. However, it did not end there. The new political 
system went into further ‘complex consociationalism’ “in the sense that it 
also outlines the institutional structure of the state, autonomy provisions 
for the state’s entities and cantons, the judicial system, the role of the 
international community within the state, the economy, issues of security 
sector reform, and the right of the return of refugees and displaced 
persons” (Fleet 2014: 19). The constitutional system is based on the pattern 
of a power-sharing model in which the collective rights of three dominant 
ethnic groups in BiH take superiority over the rights of the individual/citizen. 
In addition, the national political parties are seen as the only legitimate 
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A key condition for the functioning of any democratic society is the 
existence of minimum political consensus about accepting the community 
in which they live (Balic and Izmirlija 2013). In the case of BiH, it is hard 
even to talk about the minimum consensus, since the Bosnian Constitution 
has never been ratified in the State Parliament. Also, the ethno-religious 
political representatives in BiH still have difficulty agreeing on the reform 
policy/agenda which could accelerate the Euro-Atlantic integration 
process. There are many reasons for their disagreement: different 
interpretations of the country’s history by the constituent peoples, the role 
of the international community, and the influence of the foreign policy 
of neighbouring countries — particularly Serbia and Croatia — on the 
foreign policy of BiH. In addition, complex decision-making procedures 
grounded in the consociational democracy affect the NATO integration 
process of BiH in many negative ways. 
The Dayton Peace Accord in BiH serves as an example of the formal 
institutionalization of mutual vetoes: it devised a formula that at least one-
third support from each of the three constituent groups is required for all 
decisions in the House of Representatives. The same works for the House of 
Peoples at the state level. The proportionality principle in BiH is required in 
nearly every aspect of government and civil services. Additionally, BiH has 
a three-person presidency with one seat reserved for each of the three 
constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats). Each 
member of the presidency is elected by the members of the community 
he is to represent (McCulloch 2009). As for the veto, each of the three 
presidents can invoke a veto on policies that they view as ‘dangerous’ to 
the ‘vital interest’ of the ethnic group they represent in the presidency of 
BiH. However, when this happens, the National Assembly of the Republika 
Srpska or the BiH parliament (House of Peoples) can override a presidential 
veto by a two-thirds majority vote. The Bosnian multi-ethnic diversity and 
the ethnic-based representation in state-level institutions (and the entity 
level), as well as the aggravating political circumstances in BiH, often 
do not allow BiH to progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration. It is hard, 
and it is getting harder, to satisfy all the sides in BiH, and BiH therefore 
faces many challenges in the integration process and the fulfilment of 
indispensable reforms. Ostrom (1990) suggests that collaborative decision-
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***
NATO involvement in a non-member state: the Bosnian War 
1992-1995
When it comes to NATO membership, the Bosnian experience of NATO 
shapes its decision-making process regarding integration, and it is often 
used for public justification of a decision not to become a NATO member 
state, particularly in Republika Srpska. The relationship between BiH and 
NATO is in many ways unique and the NATO intervention in BiH is described 
as a ‘milestone’ of the relationship (Kivimaki, Kramer and Pasch 2012). 
The NATO alliance intervened in BiH in 1995 as a consequence of war 
crimes and the suspension of the Geneva Convention (NATO 2005). BiH 
became the first non-NATO member state in which the Western Alliance 
conducted military operations. In addition, military operations led by 
NATO during the 1990s in BiH, Serbia and Kosovo have had a significant 
influence on the NATO integration process, as well as on the population in 
these Western Balkan countries. For instance, the president of Republika 
Srpska, Milorad Dodik, said that Republika Srpska formed its view towards 
NATO (a negative tendency towards the membership), and pointed 
out that the NATO bombing of Serbs in Republika Srpska influenced the 
formation of such an attitude, especially because the NATO bombings 
determined the outcomes of the (Bosnian)war (Nezavisne novine 2016).
However, NATO’s intervention in 1995 and NATO’s post-war reconciliation 
role in BiH minimized the likelihood of repeated large-scale hostilities 
among the ethnic groups. The NATO membership of BIH depends on 
the political elites and their ability to harmonize their divided approach 
towards NATO membership. The 1995 NATO intervention in BiH targeted 
the Bosnian Serbs who refused to comply with the Geneva Convention, 
which created a favourable situation for the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats: 
this is why it is difficult for the Bosnian government to get the support of the 
Bosnian Serbs for NATO membership. 
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***
The role of the international community: protector of social 
order and the statehood
The end of the Bosnian war and enforcement of the Dayton Peace 
Accords in 1995 defined the role of the international community (IC) in 
the country. The IC is obliged to monitor the accords from the peace 
agreement and help the warring parties overcome various challenges. 
BiH, because of the presence of the IC, could have been classified as 
a country with (semi-) protectorate status in international relations. The 
presence of the IC is perhaps the key difference between BiH and other 
countries in Eastern Europe and Western Balkan.
The OHR, as the main institution of the IC in BiH, is responsible for monitoring 
the Dayton Peace Accords in the country. It is also the only interpreter of 
the DPA in case of any major political disputes between the conflicting 
parties. The OHR “is working with the people and institutions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the international community to ensure that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for 
integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions” (OHR n.d.: i). The period of the OHR 
intervention in the politics of BiH can be divided into several phases: (1) 
the period of interest of the IC without direct interference; (2) the period of 
interest of the IC by strengthening the role of the OHR in domestic politics 
in BiH; (3) the period of withdrawal of the IC and the policy of silence of 
the OHR in BiH; and (4) the period of shutting down the OHR in BiH once 
the country fulfils the required criteria (Borić 2012).
Most of the reforms that supported the Euro-Atlantic integration process 
emerged out of the active involvement of OHR and other international 
institutions in BiH, such as the EU Delegation and NATO. At the moment, 
the OHR policy is in its third stage, the period of withdrawal of the IC and 
silence of the OHR in BiH. This stage of the OHR policy is a test for the 
domestic institutions which perhaps failed to show the results that the 
OHR policy-makers desired. The failure of the political leaders to meet 
the criteria specified by the third OHR stage was clearly demonstrated 
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with the illegal referendum organized by the Republika Srpska (RS) on 25 
September 2016. The referendum was held in spite of the ban imposed by 
the High Court of BiH and the outcry of the OHR. According to a statement 
by Valentin Incko, the High Representative, the purpose of the hands-
off approach by the OHR was to provide the institutions in BiH with the 
opportunity to strengthen and mature (BBC 2016b). However, this policy 
proved itself non-functional, and it seems that the third stage of the OHR 
policy will succeed only when the entities demonstrate mature politics 
and start paying respect to the state institutions.
The aggravating political circumstances in BiH prevent the OHR from 
entering into the fourth stage, the period of shutting down the OHR in BiH. 
This stage of the OHR requires more analysis than the previous stages, as 
it could lead the country to new political instability. Therefore, the OHR is 
delaying its withdrawal from BiH until the required criteria are met by the 
political elites in both entities. Very often BiH has only functioned because 
of the presence of the ‘protector’ — that is, the IC and OHR as the 
executive body. The OHR is very clear regarding its presence in BiH: if BiH 
wants to free itself from the OHR presence, the country must establish a 
different political system (International Crisis Group 2014). Also, without the 
support of all the member states of the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC), the OHR is currently in a sort of geopolitical vacuum and as such it is 
unable to exert more influence over the Bosnian political decision-makers.
***
The influence of neighbouring countries in the NATO 
integration policy 
In terms of external actors, the influence of the neighbouring countries 
of BiH — called guarantors of the DPA — affects the attitude of Serbs 
and Croats in BiH to a significant extent. In the geopolitical context, the 
alleged Serbian foreign policy influence failed in preventing Montenegro 
from NATO integration. Unlike their status in BiH, the Serbian population 
could not use the institutional mechanism, asking for protection of ‘vital 
national interest’ in order to block the Montenegrin NATO membership. 
The membership of Montenegro is a historic turn towards the West and 
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away from its traditional ally, Russia. Janusz Bugajski, a Senior Fellow at 
the Centre for European Policy Analysis, stated that “Montenegro’s 
membership in NATO could change the way Serbians view the alliance” 
(B92 2017: i). However, this might be difficult to achieve in reality as a 
large part of the population and political elites in Serbia consider Russia as 
a reliable ally.9 Serbia is balanced between EU membership, partnership 
with NATO and cooperation with Russia. 
BiH’s NATO membership could contribute to an upgrade of the Western 
Balkans’ security situation, as the NATO member states do not fight against 
each other and jointly contribute to common security. Analysing the 
security policy of BiH, it can be argued that NATO membership would play 
a significant role in the security of the entire region. The NATO Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said “NATO’s vision for the Western 
Balkans region is clear: Euro-Atlantic integration is the best guarantee for 
peace, progress and prosperity” (NATO 2011). Regardless of this statement 
and many international NATO documents that guarantee Bosnia security 
under the Alliance, BiH still needs to do a lot in order to meet NATO 
requirements for integration. In short, Bosnian NATO integration conflicts 
with the influence of regional actors and their attitudes and interests. 
Serbia and Croatia have substantial political influence on BiH because 
of the significant Serbian and/or Croatian population in BiH and due 
to the fact that both of these countries were signatories of the DPA. 
Based on contextual analysis of the available statements by some of 
the top politicians, it can be concluded that Croatia and Montenegro 
support BiH’s NATO membership. Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-
Kitarovic expressed Croatia’s willingness to support BiH in the EU and 
NATO integration process. “Personally, I advocate and I will advocate 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s European integration, because I see Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as a member of the EU and NATO as soon as possible, 
because it is a prerequisite for a lasting peace and a better life for all 
citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Hrvatski medijski servis 2015, author’s 
translation). The idea behind Grabar-Kitarović attitude is to ensure and 
improve security in the Western Balkans. NATO membership would help 
BiH become a stable and reliable regional player.
9 The Survey of Serbian Public Opinion, 24 November 2015–3 December 2015, conducted by Centre for Insight in Survey 
Research, showed that 94 per cent of interviewees think that Serbia’s interests are best served by maintaining strong 
relations with Russia, while only six per cent of interviewees disagreed with this statement. 
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Actual interference of regional countries that has an unfavourable effect 
on BiH’s NATO integration is seen in Serbia. It is demonstrated in the political 
statements and decisions by both Serbs in BiH and Serbia. The President 
of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, said that public opinion in the RS is 
overwhelmingly against joining NATO, adding that “it is a dangerous 
situation for Serbia to remain neutral, and the RS goes to membership 
in the military organization” (Nova srpska politička misao 2015, author’s 
translation). In addition, Serbia accepted the Declaration of military 
neutrality in 2007, the effects of which are visible in the BiH integration 
process. The Serbian decision not to become a NATO member state from 
24 March 2017 was confirmed by Aleksandar Vučić, the President of Serbia, 
who said that “Serbia will never look for NATO membership, and [Serbia] 
will not allow the suffering of Serbs to be repeated” (Nezavisne novine 
2017: xvi, author’s translation). This has had a negative impact on the NATO 
integration of BiH because political leaders in RS stated that they would 
align with Serbia regarding NATO cooperation. The Serb member of the 
Presidency of BiH, Mladen Ivanić, stated: “I can only repeat that in NATO 
we can enter only if and when the Alliance enters Serbia. The position 
cannot be clearer position than this. Any other option would include the 
division of the Serbian people. We do not need referendums. The subject 
does not even need to be opened because of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
membership in NATO; there is no requirement as long as Serbia is not in 
the Alliance” (Politika 2015: vii, author’s translation). Such a policy is also 
included in the political programmes of the Serbian political parties in BiH. 
For instance, the political platform of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) 
promotes the military neutrality of BiH and adherence to the [military] 
status of Serbia,10 while the “Serbian Democratic Party fully opposes the 
idea of the Republic of Srpska being a part of NATO” (Serb Democratic 
Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina n.d.: 72). 
10 The “Serbian Democratic Party sees military neutrality and demilitarization of the Republic of Srpska and BiH as the 
only realistic policy in this region. It is a genuine interest of the Republic of Srpska to have identical status as that of the 
Republic of Serbia in order to prevent some situations that had occurred in a relatively recent past period that Serbs 
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Conclusion 
The NATO security matrix in the Western Balkans contains elements of 
peace, stability and security from the perspective of one group, Bosniaks 
and Bosnian Croats, and elements of instability, insecurity and danger from 
the perspective of another, Bosnian Serbs. Such a security environment 
thus produces positive and negative effects on the security of the Western 
Balkan countries. Both of the above-mentioned perspectives are the 
result of either internal or external factors. The divergent opinions on this 
question range from opportunistic press releases to enthusiastic support 
for the membership; or from NATO-centric to NATO-sceptic attitudes. 
These diverging attitudes would not be problematic if BiH had other 
alternatives. Other current NATO member states had similar attitudes prior 
to accession, but none of the current NATO member states in East Europe 
and the Western Balkans were faced with the internal and external factors 
with which BiH is faced at the moment. The idea of this paper is not to 
suggest that the current NATO member states passed through the NATO 
integration process easily, but rather that, due to its specificities, BiH has 
been maintaining a status quo over the last few years. It is important to 
emphasize that during this period BiH has not lost much, but the option to 
return to the status quo ante, or state of affairs that existed previously, is 
still a real threat.
A certain body of literature and media reports has failed to identify the 
‘specifics’ of BiH and as a result many researchers interested in Bosnian 
NATO integration have not been able to grasp the whole picture of the 
Bosnian path to NATO. This study has identified four major specifics of BiH 
that make its integration process different from other countries. Because 
of the specifics analysed in this paper, this study aimed to address the 
following questions: (i) whether domestic politics influence the foreign 
policy of BiH; and (ii) to what extent the neighbouring countries determine 
the foreign policy of BiH regarding NATO. A clear-cut distinction between 
these two factors was not identified, firstly, because two of the specifics 
determine the ‘domestic political view’ on the NATO membership of BiH: 
(i) NATO involvement in the Bosnian war 1992–1995 and (ii) the country’s 
consociationalism. NATO involvement in the Bosnian war has created 
NATO-centric or NATO-sceptic approaches, depending on the ethnic 
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group, and Bosnian consociationalism is a mechanism which transforms 
these approaches into policies. Due to its current political system, the will of 
the ‘opposition’ prevails over others by using the mechanisms of the entity 
vote and protection of vital national interests. As noted above, Mladen 
Ivanić, the Serb member of the BiH Presidency, pointed out that the 
unsolved issue of property defence is an instrument freezing the process 
of BiH integration into NATO. He added that “it is easier for [politicians from 
the Republika Srpska] to talk about a dispute over property than a dispute 
over membership in NATO” (Bećirević, Ćurak and Turčalo 2014:34). This 
attitude has slowed down BiH’s NATO membership regardless of the 
other constituent peoples’ will to join. The attitude of the Bosnian Serbs 
is the result of war events, but mostly their sympathy towards Russia and 
Serbia. Secondly, Bosnian foreign policy and its attitude towards NATO 
membership are not only shaped by domestic factors, but rather jointly 
with external factors. Often, Bosnian foreign policy cannot avoid the 
influence of external factors — that is, interference by Serbia and Croatia. 
This leaves enough room for future research to address the question of the 
extent to which BiH creates its foreign policy independently. In addition, 
Serbian politicians in BiH sent a clear message on a number of occasions 
that the military status of BiH would be determined by the military status 
of Serbia — that is, if Serbia stays out of NATO, BiH will do the same. On 
the other hand, Croatia showed readiness to support the Euro-Atlantic 
integration of BiH, at least officially. 
Lastly, because of all of the Bosnian specificities, this paper has advocated 
that the aspiration of BiH to become a NATO member state cannot 
be viewed through the prism of other NATO member states’ accession 
processes. The Bosnian challenges of NATO integration are much more 
complex than any other challenges that the existing NATO member states 
had to face. The external influence to prevent BiH from NATO integration 
remains the most challenging barrier in the process. 
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